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Abstract
Code obfuscation is a major tool for protecting soft-
ware intellectual property from attacks such as re-
verse engineering or code tampering. Yet, recently
proposed (automated) attacks based on Dynamic Sym-
bolic Execution (DSE) shows very promising results,
hence threatening software integrity. Current defenses
are not fully satisfactory, being either not efficient
against symbolic reasoning, or affecting runtime per-
formance too much, or being too easy to spot. We
present and study a new class of anti-DSE protec-
tions coined as path-oriented protections targeting the
weakest spot of DSE, namely path exploration. We
propose a lightweight, efficient, resistant and analyti-
cally proved class of obfuscation algorithms designed
to hinder DSE-based attacks. Extensive evaluation
demonstrates that these approaches critically counter
symbolic deobfuscation while yielding only a very
slight overhead.
1 Introduction
Context. Reverse engineering and code tampering
are widely used to extract proprietary assets (e.g.,
algorithms or cryptographic keys) or bypass security
checks from software. Code protection techniques
precisely seek to prevent, or at least make difficult,
such man-at-the-end attacks, where the attacker has
total control of the environment running the software
under attack. Obfuscation [19, 20] aims at hiding a
program’s behavior by transforming its executable
code in such a way that the behavior is conserved but
the program becomes much harder to understand.
Even though obfuscation techniques are quite re-
silient against basic automatic reverse engineering
(including static attacks, e.g. disassembly, and dy-
namic attacks, e.g. monitoring), code analysis im-
proves quickly [37]. Recent attacks based on Dy-
namic Symbolic Execution (DSE, a.k.a. concolic ex-
ecution) [17,28,38] use logical formulas to represent
input constraints along an execution path, and then
automatically solve these constraints to discover new
execution paths. DSE appears to be very efficient
against existing obfuscations [5, 8, 22,35,49], combin-
ing the best of dynamic and semantic analysis.
Problem. The current state of symbolic deobfusca-
tion is actually pretty unclear. Dedicated protections
have been proposed, mainly based on hard-to-solve
predicates, like Mixed Boolean Arithmetic formulas
(MBA) [50] or cryptographic hash functions [40]. Yet
the effect of complexified constraints on automatic
solvers is hard to predict [6], while cryptographic
hash functions are easy to spot, may induce signif-
icant overhead and are amenable to key extraction
attacks (possibly by DSE).
On the other hand, DSE has been fruitfully applied
on malware and legit codes protected by state-of-
the-art tools and methods, including virtualization,
self-modification, hashing or MBA [8, 35, 49]. The
recent systematic experimental evaluation of symbolic
deobfuscation by Banescu et al. [5] shows that most
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standard obfuscation techniques do not seriously im-
pact DSE. Only nested virtualization seems to provide
a good protection, assuming the defender is ready to
pay a high cost in terms of runtime and code size [35].
Goals and Challenges. We want to propose a new
class of dedicated anti-DSE obfuscation techniques to
render automated attacks based on symbolic execu-
tion inefficient. These techniques should be strong –
making DSE intractable in practice, and lightweight –
with very low overhead in both code size and runtime
performance. While most anti-DSE defenses try to
break the symbolic reasoning part of DSE (constraint
solver), we instead target its real weak spot, namely
path exploration. Banescu et al. [5] present one such
specific obfuscation scheme but with a large space
overhead and no experimental evaluation. We aim at
proposing a general framework to understand such
obfuscations and to define new schemes both strong
and lightweight.
Contribution. We study path-oriented protections,
a class of protections seeking to hinder DSE by sub-
stantially increasing the number of feasible paths
within a program.
• We detail a formal framework describing path-
oriented protections (Sec. 4). We characterize their
desirable properties — namely tractability, strength,
and the key criterion of single value path (SVP). The
framework is predictive, in the sense that our classifica-
tion is confirmed by experimental evaluation (Sec. 8),
allowing both to shed new light on the few existing
path-oriented protections and to provide guidelines
to design new ones. In particular, no existing protec-
tion [5] achieves both tractability and optimal strength
(SVP). As a remedy, we propose the first two obfusca-
tion schemes achieving both tractability and optimal
strength (Sec. 5).
• We highlight the importance of the anchorage pol-
icy, i.e. the way to choose where to insert protection in
the code, in terms of protection efficiency and robust-
ness. Especially, we identify a way to achieve optimal
composition of path-oriented protections (Sec. 6.1),
and to completely prevent taint-based and slic-based
attacks (two powerful code-level attacks against ob-
fuscation), coined as resistance by design (Sec. 6.2).
• We conduct extensive experiments (Sec. 8.3) with
two different attack scenarios — exhaustive path cover-
age (Sec. 8.3) and secret finding. Results confirm that
path-oriented protections are much stronger against
DSE attacks than standard protections (including
nested virtualization) for only a slight overhead. More-
over, while existing techniques [5] can still be weak in
some scenarios (e.g., secret finding), our new optimal
schemes cripple symbolic deobfuscation at essentially
no cost in any setting. Finally, experiments against
slice, pattern-matching and taint attacks confirm the
quality of our robust-by-design mechanism.
As a practical outcome, we propose a new hardened
deobfuscation benchmark (Sec. 9), currently out-of-
reach of symbolic engines, in order to extend existing
obfuscation benchmarks [1, 5, 35].
Discussion. We study a powerful class of protections
against symbolic deobfuscation, based on a careful
analysis of DSE – we target its weakest point (path
exploration) when other dedicated methods usually
aim at its strongest point (constraint solving and
ever-evolving SMT solvers). We propose a predictive
framework allowing to understand these protections,
as well as several concrete protections impacting DSE
more than three levels of virtualization at essentially
no cost. We expect them to be also efficient against
other semantic attacks [10, 29] (cf. Sec. 10). From
a methodological point of view, this work extends
recent attempts at rigorous evaluation of obfuscation
methods. We provide both an analytical evaluation,
as Bruni et al. [14] for anti-abstract model checking,
and a refinement of the experimental setup initiated
by Banescu et al. [5].
2 Motivation
2.1 Attacker model
Goal. We consider man-at-the-end scenarios where
the attacker has full access to a potentially protected
code under attack. The attacker has just the binary
code and no access to the source code. The attacker
model and the methodology follows closely the sur-
vey by Schrittwieser et al. [37]. In order to be more
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concrete, we will focus on the following (intermediate)
goals: 1. Exhaustive Path Exploration. Covering ev-
ery feasible path of the binary allows the attacker to
retrieve a consistent Control Flow Graph and under-
stand what the original program performs. 2. Secret
Finding. Focusing on a specific part of the code (e.g.
license checks) and try to understand or retrieve a
secret (e.g. a key).
Capacity. we assume an all-powerful symbolic adver-
sary, that is, this adversary can run a correct and com-
plete Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE). In practice,
symbolic engines are correct — every path discovered
is actually feasible — but incomplete — they can be
tricked into missing feasible paths [48] or the under-
lying solver may timeout. This adversary can also
perform additional code-analysis based attack steps,
such as slicing- [42], pattern-matching or tainting-
based [38] code simplifications.
Caveat. In the remains, we always consider this at-
tacker model. There is one caveat that it is worth
mentioning now: part of our experimental evaluations
are done from source codes, i.e. in our experiments
the attacker has sometimes the source code. The rea-
son is that state-of-the-art source-level DSE tools are
much more efficient than binary-level ones, and that
there is no good state-of-the-art tools to perform slice
or taint attacks on binary codes. Our experimental
conditions are much more in favor of the at-
tacker, and as a result they show that our approach
is all the more effective.
2.2 Motivating example
Let us illustrate anti-symbolic path-oriented protec-
tions on a toy crackme program1. Fig. 1 displays a
skeleton of its source code. main calls check to verify
each character of the 11 bytes input. It then out-
puts ”win” for a correct guess, ”lose” otherwise. Each
subfunction check char ii∈[0,10] hides a secret character
value behind bitwise transformations, like xor or shift.
Such a challenge can be easily solved, completely au-
tomatically, by symbolic execution tools. KLEE [16]
needs 0.03s (on C code) and Binsec [24] 0.3s (on
1https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore
int check char 0 (char chr ){
char ch = chr ;
ch ˆ= 97 ;
return ( ch == 31 ) ;
}
/∗ . . . 9 o ther checks . . . ∗/
int check char 10 (char chr ){ /∗ . . . ∗/ }
int check (char∗ buf ) {
int r e t v a l = 1 ;
r e t v a l ∗= check char 0 ( buf [ 0 ] ) ;
/∗ . . . check buf [ 1 ] to bu f [ 9 ] . . . ∗/
r e t v a l ∗= check char 10 ( buf [ 1 0 ] ) ;
return r e t v a l ;
}
int main ( int argc , char∗∗ argv ) {
char∗ buf = argv [ 1 ] ;
i f ( check ( buf ) ) puts ( ”win” ) ;
else puts ( ” l o s e ” ) ;
}
Figure 1: Manticore crackme code structure
binary code) to both find a winning input and explore
all paths.
Standard protections. Let us now protect the pro-
gram with standard obfuscations to measure their
impact on symbolic deobfuscation. We will rely on
Tigress [21], a widely used tool for systematic eval-
uation of deobfuscation methods [5, 8, 35], to apply
(nested) virtualization, a most effective obfuscation [5].
Yet, Table 1 clearly shows that virtualization does
not prevent KLEE from finding the winning output,
though it can thwart path exploration – but with a
high runtime overhead (40×).
The case for (new) path-oriented protections.
To defend against symbolic attackers, we thus need
better anti-DSE obfuscation: path-oriented protec-
tions. Such protections aim at exponentially increas-
ing the number of paths that a DSE-based deobfus-
cation tool, like KLEE, must explore. Two such pro-
tections are Split and For, illustrated in Fig. 2 on
function check char 0 of the example.
For the sake of simplicity, the protections are im-
plemented in a naive form, sensitive to slicing or
compiler optimizations. Robustness is discussed after-
wards. In a nutshell, Split— an instance of Range
3
For
int func (char chr ){
char ch = 0 ;
for (int i=0; i<chr; i++)
ch++;
ch ˆ= 97 ;
return ( ch == 31 ) ;
}
Split
int func (char chr , ch1 ,
ch2 ) {
// new input char ch1
and ch2
char garb = 0 //
junk
char ch = chr ;
if (ch1 > 60)
garb++;
else
garb−−;
if (ch2 > 20)
garb++;
else
garb−−;
ch ˆ= 97 ;
return ( ch == 31) ;
}
Figure 2: Unoptimized obfuscation of check char 0
Divider [5] — adds a number k of conditional state-
ments depending on new fresh inputs, increasing the
number of paths to explore by a factor of 2k. Also,
in this implementation we use a junk variable garb
and two additional inputs ch1 and ch2 unrelated to
the original code. The novel obfuscation For (Sec. 5)
adds k loops whose upper bound depends on distinct
input bytes and which recompute a value that will be
used later, expanding the number of paths to explore
by a factor of 28·k – assuming a 8-bit char type. This
implementation does not introduce any junk variable
nor additional input. In both cases, the obfuscated
code relies on the input, forcing DSE to explore a
priori all paths. Table 1 summarizes the performance
of Split and For. Both Split and For do not
induce any overhead, Split is highly efficient (time-
out) against coverage but not against secret finding,
while For is highly efficient for both. For (k = 2)
performs already better than Split (k = 19) and
further experiments (Sec. 8) shows For to be a much
more effective path protection than Split.
Question: How to distinguish a priori between mildly
effective and very strong path-oriented protections?
Note that gcc -Ofast is able to remove this simple
Split, as it is not related to the output (slicing attack).
The basic For resists such attack, but clang -Ofast
is able to remove it by an analysis akin to a pattern
Table 1: DSE Attack on the Crackme Example
(KLEE)
Obfuscation type
Slowdown
Symbolic
Execution
Over-
head
Cover-
age
Secret
run-
time
Standard
Virt ×× ×× ×1.1
Virt ×2 × ×× ×1.3
Virt ×3 X × ×40
Path-Oriented
k = 11 ×× ×× ×1.0
SPLIT k = 15 X ×× ×1.0
[5] k = 19 X ×× ×1.0
k = 1 X × ×1.0
FOR k = 2 X X ×1.0
(new) k = 3 X X ×1.0
×× t ≤ 1s × 30s < t < 5min X time out (≥ 1h30)
Unobfuscated case: KLEE succeeds in 0.03s
attack. However, a sightly modified For (Fig. 3)
overcomes such optimizations.
int func (char chr ) {
int ch = 0 ; // prevent char ove r f l ows
for (int i=0; i< (int) chr; i++){
if (i % 2 == 0) ch += 3;
if (i % 2 != 0) ch−−;
}
if (i % 2 != 0) ch -= 2; // ad ju s t f o r odd va lue s
ch ˆ= 97 ;
return ( ch == 31 ) ;
}
Figure 3: Enhanced For – check char 0
Question: How to protect path-oriented protections
against code analysis-based attacks (slicing, tainting,
patterns)?
The goal of this paper is to define, analyze and
explore in a systematic way the potential of path-
oriented transformations as anti-DSE protections. We
define a predictive framework (Sec. 4) and propose
several new concrete protections (Sec. 5). In particular,
our framework allows to precisely explain why For
is experimentally better than Split. We also discuss
how path-oriented protections can be made resistant
to several types of attacks (Sec. 6 and 7).
3 Background
Obfuscation. Obfuscation [20] aims at hiding a pro-
gram’s behavior or protecting proprietary information
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such as algorithms or cryptographic keys by trans-
forming the program to protect P into a program P ′
such that P ′ and P are semantically equivalent, P ′ is
roughly as efficient as P and P ′ is harder to under-
stand. While it is still unknown whether applicable
theoretical criteria of obfuscation exist [7], practical
obfuscation techniques and tools do.
Let us touch briefly on three such important tech-
niques.
• Mixed Boolean-Arithmetic [27, 50] transforms an
arithmetic and/or Boolean equation into another
using a combination of Boolean and arithmetic
operands with the goal to be more complex to
understand and more difficult to solve by SMT
solvers [9, 44].
• Virtualization and Flattening [45] transform the
control flow into an interpreter loop dispatching
every instruction. Virtualization even adds a vir-
tual machine interpreter for a custom bytecode
program encoding the original program seman-
tic. Consequently, the visible control flow of the
protected program is very far from the original
control flow. Virtualization can be nested, encod-
ing the virtual machine itself into another virtual
machine.
• Self-modifying code and Packing insert instruc-
tions that dynamically modify the flow of exe-
cuted instructions. These techniques seriously
damage static analyses by hiding the real instruc-
tions. However, extracting the hidden code can
be done by dynamic approaches [26,30], including
DSE [49].
Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE). Symbolic
execution [17] simulates the execution of a program
along its paths, systematically generating inputs for
each new discovered branch condition. This explo-
ration process consider inputs as symbolic variables
whose value is not fixed. The symbolic execution
engine follows a path and each time a conditional
statement involving the input is encountered, it adds
a constraint to the symbolic value related to this in-
put. Solving the constraints automatically (typically
with off-the-shelf SMT solvers [44]) then allows to
generate new input values leading to new paths, pro-
gressively covering all paths of the program – up to
a user-defined bound. The technique has seen strong
renewed interest in the last decade to become a promi-
nent bug finding technique [17,18,28].
When the symbolic engine cannot perfectly han-
dle some constructs of the underlying programming
language — like system calls or self-modification —
the symbolic reasoning is interleaved with a dynamic
analysis allowing meaningful (and fruitful) approxima-
tions – Dynamic Symbolic Execution [28]. Typically,
(concrete) runtime values are used to complete miss-
ing part of path constraints that are then fed to the
solver through concretization [23]. This feature makes
the approach especially robust against complicated
constructs found in obfuscated binary codes, typically
packing or self-modification, making DSE a strong
candidate for automated deobfuscation – symbolic de-
obfuscation: it is as robust as dynamic analysis, with
the additional ability to infer trigger-based conditions.
4 A framework for path-
oriented protections
This section presents a framework to evaluate path-
oriented obfuscations, i.e. protections aiming at hin-
dering symbolic deobfuscation by taking advantage of
path explosion.
Find placement Add forking point
code protected code
obfuscation scheme
Anchorage policy Class(es) of forking points
Figure 4: Path-Oriented Obfuscation Framework
4.1 Basic definitions
This paper deals with a specific kind of protections tar-
geting DSE: path-oriented protections. Transforming
a program P into P ′ using path-oriented protections
ensures that P ′ is functionally equivalent to P and
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aims to guarantee #Π′  #Π, meaning the number
of paths in P ′ is much greater that the ones in P.
The most basic path-oriented protection consists in
one forking point inserted in the original code of P.
Definition 1 (Forking Point) A forking point
F is a location in the code that creates at most γ new
paths. F is defined by: an address a, a variable x and
a capacity γ. It is written F(a, x, γ)
To illustrate this definition, see the snippet of Split
in Figure 2: both if-statements define each a forking
point of capacity 2 based on the variable ch1 and ch2
respectively.
Now, to obtain a complete path-oriented obfusca-
tion P ′ of a program P, we need to insert n forking
points throughout the code of P, hence the notion of
obfuscation scheme (Fig. 4).
Definition 2 (Obfuscation scheme) A (path-
oriented protection) obfuscation scheme is a function
f(P, n) that, for every program P, inserts n forking
points in P. It comprises a set of forking points and
an anchorage policy, i.e. the placement method of the
forking points.
4.2 Desirable obfuscation scheme
properties
An ideal obfuscation scheme is both strong (high cost
for the attacker) and cheap (low cost for the defender).
Let us define these properties more precisely.
The strength of an obfuscation scheme is intu-
itively the expected increase of the search space for
the attacker. Given an obfuscation scheme f , it is
defined as Γf (P, n) = #Πf(P,n), for a program P and
n forking points to insert.
The cost is intuitively the maximal runtime over-
head the defender should worry about. Given an
obfuscation scheme f , cost is defined by Ωf (P, n), as
the maximum trace size of the obfuscated program
f(P, n). Formally, Ωf (P, n) = maxi{|τ ′i |} where {τ ′i}
is the set of execution traces of f(P, n) and |τ ′i | is the
size of the trace.
We seek strong tractable obfuscations, i.e., yielding
enough added paths to get a substantial slowdown,
with a low runtime overhead.
Definition 3 (Strong scheme) An obfuscation
scheme f is strong if for any program P, we have
Γf (P, n) ≥ 2O(n) ·#ΠP , where ΠP is the set of paths
of P. Putting things quickly, it means that the number
of paths to explore is multiplied by 2n.
Definition 4 (Tractable scheme) An obfusca-
tion scheme f is tractable if for any program P,
Ωf (P, n) ≤ maxi{|τi|} + O(n), where maxi{|τi|} is
the size of the longest trace of P. In other words, it is
tractable only if the overhead runtime is linear on n.
Combining schemes. Scheme composition pre-
serves tractability (the definition involves an upper
bound) but not necessarily strength (the definition
involves a lower bound). Hence, we need optimal
composition rules (Sec. 6.1).
4.3 Building stronger schemes
Strong path-oriented protections, can rely on compo-
sition but we saw in Sec. 4.2 that it is not straightfor-
ward. But since path-oriented protections first lean
on forking execution into many paths, we should also
investigate whether some forking points are better
that others. The best case is to insert k forking points
(F(ai, xi, γi))i such that it would ensure that each
path created by a forking point (F(ai, xi, γi))i corre-
sponds to only one possible value of the variable xi.
This leads us to define this type of forking point as a
Single Value Path (SVP) protection.
Definition 5 (Single Value Path) A forking
point based on variable x is Single Value Path (SVP)
if and only if x has only one possible value in each
path created by the protection.
A SVP forking point creates a new path for each
possible value of variable x (e.g., i.e., 232 new paths
are created for an unconstrained C int variable). For
example, the For obfuscation shown in Figure 2 pro-
duces 232 paths, that should be a priori explored since
it depends on an input variable. SVP forking points
is key to ensure that DSE will need to enumerate all
possible input values of the program under analysis
(thus boiling down to brute forcing) – see Sec. 6.
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5 Concrete Path-oriented pro-
tections
This section reviews existing path-oriented protection
schemes within the framework of Sec. 4, but also
details new such schemes achieving both tractability
and optimal strength (SVP).
int main ( int argc , char∗∗ argv ) {
char∗ input = argv [ 1 ] ;
char chr = ∗ input ; // in s e r t e d by
ob fu s ca t i on
switch ( chr ) { // in s e r t e d by ob fu s ca t i on
case 1 : . . . // o r i g i n a l code
break ;
case 2 : // ob fusca t ed ver s ion o f case 1
break ;
. . .
default : // another ob fusca t ed ver s ion
o f case 1
break ;
}
return (∗ input >= 100) ;
}
Figure 5: Range Divider obfuscation
Range Divider [5]. Range Divider is an anti-
symbolic execution obfuscation proposed by Banescu
et al.. Branch conditions are inserted in basic blocks
to divide the input value range into multiple sets.
The code inside each branch of the conditional state-
ment is an obfuscated version of the original code.
We distinguish two cases, depending on whether the
branch condition uses a switch or a if statement. In
the remaining part of this paper, Split will denote the
Range Divider obfuscation with if statement, and
Range Divider the Range Divider obfuscation
with switch statement.
The Range Divider (switch) scheme introduces
an exhaustive switch statement over all possible values
of a given variable – see example in Fig. 5, thus
yielding 2S extra-paths, with S the bit size of the
variable. This scheme enjoys the SVP property as in
each branch of the switch the target variable can have
only one value, and it is also tractable in time provided
the switch is efficiently compiled into a binary search
tree or a jump table, as usual. Yet, while not pointed
out by Banescu et al., this scheme is not tractable
in space (code size) as it leads to huge amount of
code duplication – the byte case may be fine, but not
above.
int main ( int argc , char∗∗ argv ) {
char∗ input = argv [ 1 ] ;
char chr = ∗ input ; // in s e r t e d by
ob fu s ca t i on
i f ( chr < 30) { // in s e r t e d by
ob fu s ca t i on
. . . // o r i g i n a l code O
}
else . . . // ob fusca t ed ver s ion o f O
return (∗ input >= 100) ;
}
Figure 6: Split obfuscation
Split [5]. This transformation (Fig. 6) is similar to
Range Divider, but the control-flow is split by a
condition triggered by a variable. This protection is
tractable in both time (only one additional condition
check per forking point) and space (only one block
duplication per forking point). Yet, the protection is
not SVP.
For (new). The For scheme (Fig. 2)
replaces assignments ch := chr by loops
ch = 0; for ( i = 0; i <= chr; i++) ch++; where chr
is an input-dependent variable. Intuitively, such for
loops can be unrolled n times, for any value n that
chr can take at runtime. Hence, a loop controlled by
a variable defined over a bit size S generates up to 2S
extra-paths, with additional path length of 2S . While
the achieved protection is excellent, it is intractable
when S = 32 or S = 64. The trick is to restrict this
scheme to byte-size variables, and then chain such
forking points on each byte of the variable of interest.
Indeed, For over a byte-size variable generates up to
28 additional paths with an additional path length at
most of 28. More informaion about this is given in
Appendix A.
Chaining k forking points such For loops leads
up to 28k extra-paths with an extra-length of only
k ·28, keeping strength while making runtime overhead
reasonable. (More precisely with a constant time
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overhead wrt inputs.)
Write (new). The Write obfuscation adds self-
modification operations to the code. It replaces an
assignment a := input with a non input-dependent op-
eration a := k (with k an arbitrary constant value) and
replaces at runtime this instruction by a := i where i
is the runtime value of input (self-modification). This
is illustrated in Fig. 7, where the offset move at la-
bel L1 actually rewrites the constant 0 at L2 to the
value contained at the address of the input. More
detailed information about Write can be found in
Appendix A.
L : mov [ a ] , [ input ] ⇒ L1 : mov L2+o f f , [ input ]L2 : mov [ a ] , 0
Figure 7: Write obfuscation
Symbolic execution engines are not likely to relate
a and input, thus thinking that a is constant across
all executions. If the dynamic part of the engine
spots that a may have different values, it will iterate
over every possible values of input, creating new paths
each time. The scheme is SVP, and its overhead is
negligible (2 additional instructions, independent of
the bit size of the targeted variable as long as it can
be handled natively by the underlying architecture).
Write has yet two drawbacks: it can be spotted by
a dynamic analysis and needs the section containing
the code to be writable.
Table 2: Classification of obfuscation schemes
Tractable SVP Stealth
Time Space
Range Divider [5] switch X × X ×
Split [5] if X X × X
For
word × X X X
byte X X X X
Write X X X ∼
Summary. The properties of every scheme presented
so far are summarized in Table 2 – stealth is discussed
in Sec. 7.2. Obfuscation schemes from the literature
are not fully satisfactory: Range Divider is space
expensive and easy to spot, Split is not strong enough
(not SVP). On the other hand, the new schemes For
(at byte-level) and Write are both strong (they satisfy
SVP) and tractable, making them perfect anti-DSE
protections.
As a consequence, we suggest using variations of
For as the main protection layer, with Write de-
ployed only when self-modification and unpacking are
already used (so that the scheme remains hidden).
Range Divider can be used occasionally but only
on byte variables to mitigate space explosion. Split
can add further diversity and code complexity, but it
should not be the main defense line. All these protec-
tions must be inserted in a resistant-by-design manner
(Sec. 6.2) together with diversity of implementation
(Sec. 7.1).
6 Anchorage policy
We need to ensure that inserting path-oriented pro-
tections into a program gives real protection against
DSE and will not be circumvented by attackers.
6.1 Optimal composition
We show how to combine the forking points in order
to obtain strong obfuscation schemes. The issue with
obfuscation scheme combination is that some forking
points could hinder the efficiency of other forking
points – imagine a if(x ≥ 100) split followed by a
if(x ≤ 10) split: we will end up with 3 feasible paths
rather than the expected 2×2 = 4, as one of the path
if infeasible (x > 100 ∧ x ≤ 10).
Intuitively, we would like the forking points to be
independent from each other, in the sense that their
efficiency combine perfectly
Definition 6 (Independence) Let us consider
a program P and σ a path of P. We obfuscate this
program alternatively with two forking points F1 and
F2 such that σ encounters both forking points. This
results in three obfuscated programs: P1, P2 and P1,2.
We note #σ1 (resp. #σ2) the set of feasible paths
created from σ when encountering only F1 in P1 (resp.
F2 in P2) and #σ1,2 the set of feasible paths created
from σ when encountering both F1 and F2 in P1,2.
F1 and F2 are independent over a program P if for
all path σ passing through F1 and F2:
#σ1,2 = #σ1 ×#σ2
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An easy way to obtain forking point independence
is to consider forking points built on independent
variables – variables are independent if their values
are not computed from the same input values. Ac-
tually, if independent forking points are well placed
in the program, path-oriented protections ensure an
exponential increase in the number of paths.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Composition) Suppose
that P ′ is obtained by obfuscating the program P. If
every original path of P goes through at least k in-
dependent forking points of P ′ inserting at least θ
feasible paths, then #ΠP′ ≥ #ΠP · θk
Proof. Let’s consider a program P with #Π original
paths σi, i ∈ {1 . . .#Π}. We obfuscate P into P ′ with
an obfuscation scheme adding n independent forking
points inserting #σ1..n feasible paths. The forking
points are placed such that every original path now
contains at least k forking points.
• The total number of paths of P ′ is:
#ΠP′ =
∑
σi
#σi, σi ∈ ΠP
• According to the definition of independence, one
original path σi with at least k forking points
inserting #σi,{1..k} feasible paths creates #σi ≥∏k
j=1 #σi,j new paths
• Then,
#ΠP′ ≥
∑
σi
(
k∏
j=1
#σi,j), σi ∈ ΠP
We write θ = mini,j(#σi,j)
#ΠP′ ≥
∑
σi
(θk), σi ∈ ΠP
#ΠP′ ≥ #ΠP × θk

By choosing enough independent SVP forking
points (one for each input variable), we can even
ensure that DSE will have to enumerate over all possi-
ble input values of the program under analysis, hence
performing as bad as mere brute forcing.
Implementation. Ensuring that each path will go
through at least k forking points can be achieved
by carefully selecting the points in the code where
the forking points are inserted: a control flow graph
analysis provides information about where and how
many forking points are needed to cover all paths.
The easiest way to impact all paths at once is to
select points in the code that are not influenced by
any conditional statement. Dataflow analysis can
be used further in order to ensure that the selected
variables do not share dependencies with the same
input (independent variables).
6.2 Resistance-by-design to taint and
slice
Taint analysis [38] and (backward) slicing [42] are
two advanced code simplification methods built on
the notion of data flow relations through a program.
These data flow relations can be defined as Definition-
Use (Def-Use) chains – as used in compilers. Data are
defined when variables are assigned values or declared,
and used in expressions. Taint (resp. Slice) uses
Def-Use chains to replace input-independent by its
constant effect (resp. remove code not impacting the
output). If there exists a Def-Use chain linking data
x to data y, we write: x y. Relevant variables are
defined as having both a Def-Use chain with an input
and one with an output:
Definition 7 (Relevant Variable) x is rele-
vant if there exists at least two Def-Use chains such
that input x and x output.
A sound taint analysis (resp. slice analysis) marks
at least all variables (x,a) such that input (x, a)
(resp. (x, a) output). Unmarked variables are then
safely removed (slicing) or set to their constant value
(tainting). Thus, in order to resist by-design to such
attacks, a protection must rely on code that will be
marked by both slicing and tainting.
Here, we refine the definition of a forking point F : it
can be viewed as two parts, a guard G — the condition
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— and an action A — the code in the statement. We
denote by V ar(F) the set of variables in G and A.
We say that F is built upon relevant variables if all
variables in V ar(F) are relevant.
Theorem 2 (Resistance by design) Let us con-
sider a program P and a forking point F . Assuming
F is built upon relevant variables, then F is slice and
taint resistant.
Proof. By definition, a sound taint analysis AT will
mark any relevant variable (as they depend from in-
put). Hence, if F is built upon relevant variables,
then all variables v ∈ V ar(F) will be marked by A,
hence taint analysis A will yield no simplification on
F . In the same manner, a sound slice analysis AS
will mark any relevant variable (as they impact the
output), implying that if F is built upon relevant
variables, then analysis AS will yield no simplification
on F . 
We can actually note that to obtain resitance by-
design: (1) against tainting, it is sufficient to have
input var(G), and (2) against slicing, it is sufficient
to have var(A) output because if a slicing analysis
is able to remove the action A of the foking point then
all branches can be simplified altogether.
Implementation. Relevant variables can be iden-
tified in at least two ways. First, one can modify
standard compiler algorithms computing possible Def-
Use chains in order to compute real Def-Use chains
– technically, going from a may analysis to a must
analysis. A more original solution observes at runtime
a set of real Def-Use chains and deduces accordingly
a set of relevant variables. This method does not re-
quire any advanced static analysis, only basic dynamic
tracing features.
7 Threats
In this section we discuss possible threats to path-
oriented protections and propose adequate mitiga-
tions. Indeed, when weaving the forking points within
the code of a program, we need to ensure that they
are hard to discover or remove. Three main attacks
appear to seem effective against path-oriented protec-
tions: 1. taint analysis, 2. backward slicing, 3. and
pattern attacks. We showed how path-oriented pro-
tections can be made resistant by-design to Taint and
Slice in Sec. 6.2. We discuss now pattern attacks, as
well as stealth issues and the specific unfriendly case
of programs with a small input space.
1© for ( int i = 0 ; i++; i < input ) a++;
2© for ( int i = 0 ; i++; i < input )
a = ( a ˆ 1) + 2 ∗ ( a & 1 ) ;
3© int i = 0 ;
while ( i < input ) { i++; a++; }
4© int f ( int x ) {
return ( x <= 0 ? 0 : f ( x − 1) + 1 ) ;
}
a = f ( input ) ;
5© #define A // a r b i t r a r y va lue
int f ( int x ) {
return x <= 0 ? 0 : A + g (x − 1 ) ;
}
int g ( int x ) {
return ! x ? 1 − A : 2 − A + f(−−x ) ;
}
a = f ( input ) ;
Figure 8: Several encodings of protection For
7.1 Pattern attacks
Pattern attacks search for specific patterns in the code
of a program to identify, and remove, known obfus-
cations. This kind of analysis assumes more or less
similar constructions across all implementations of an
obfuscation scheme. A general defense against pattern
attacks is diversity. It works well in the case of path-
oriented protections: on the one hand the schemes we
provide can be implemented in many ways, and on
the other hand our framework provides guidelines to
design new schemes – altogether, it should be enough
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to defeat pattern attacks. Regarding diversity of im-
plementations, the standard For forking point can
be for example replaced by a while loop, (mutually)
recursive function(s), the loop body can be masked
through MBAs, etc. These variants can be combined
as in Fig. 8, and we can imagine many other varia-
tions.
The other schemes as well can be implemented in
many ways, and we could also think of ROP-based
encoding [39] or other diversification techniques. Alto-
gether, it should provide a powerful enough mitigation
against pattern attacks.
7.2 Stealth
In general, code protections are better when hard
to identify, in order to prevent human-level attacks
like stubbing parts of the code or designing targeted
methods. Let us evaluate the stealthiness of path-
oriented protections (summary in Table 2). Split
and For do not use rare operators or exotic control-
flow structures, only some additional conditions and
loops scattered through the program. Hence Split
and For are considered hard to detect on binary code,
though For especially may be visible at source level.
Range Divider is easy to spot at source level: switch
statements with hundreds of branches are indeed dis-
tinctive. Compilation makes it harder to find but the
height of the produced binary search trees or the size
of the generated jump table are easily perceptible.
Write stands somewhere in between. It cannot be
easily discovered statically, but is trivial to detect
dynamically. However, since self-modification and
unpacking are common in obfuscated codes, Write
could well be mistaken for one of these more standard
(and less damaging) protections.
7.3 Beware: programs with small in-
put space
Resistance by design (Sec. 6.2) relies on relevant vari-
ables, so we only have limited room for forking points.
In practice it should not be problematic as Sec. 8
shows that we already get very strong protection with
only 3 input bytes – assuming a SVP scheme. Yet,
for programs with very limited input space, we may
need to add (fake) crafted inputs for the input space
to become (apparently) larger – see Split example
in Fig. 2. In this case, our technique still ensures
resistance against tainting attacks, but slicing attacks
may now succeed. The defender must then rely on
well-known (but imperfect) anti-slicing protections
to blur code analysis through hard-to-reason-about
constructs, such as pointer aliasing, arithmetic and
bit-level identities, etc.
8 Experimental evaluation
The experiments below seek to answer four Research
Questions2:
RQ1 What is the impact of path-oriented protections
on semantic attackers? Especially, we consider
DSE attack and two different attacker goals: Path
Exploration (Goal 1) and Secret Finding (Goal
2).
RQ2 What is the cost of path-oriented protections for
the defender in runtime overhead and code size
increase?
RQ3 What is the effectiveness of our resistance-by-
design mechanism against taint and slice attacks?
RQ4 What is the difference between standard protec-
tions, path-oriented protections and SVP protec-
tions?
8.1 Experimental setup
Tools. Our attacker mainly comprises the state-of-
the-art source-level DSE tool KLEE (version 1.4.0.0
with LLVM 3.4, POSIX runtime and STP solver).
KLEE is highly optimized [16] and works from source
code, so it is arguably the worst case DSE-attacker
we can face [5]. We have considered standard search
heuristics (DFS, BFS, Non-Uniform Random Search)
but report only about DFS as others perform slightly
worse (see Appendix). Also, we used two other binary-
level DSE tools, Binsec [24] and Triton [36], with
similar results.
2 Download at https://bit.ly/2wYSEDG – deanonymation
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Regarding standard defense, we use Tigress [21], a
freely available state-of-the-art obfuscator featuring
many standard obfuscations and allowing to precisely
control which ones are used – making Tigress a tool of
choice for the systematic evaluation of deobfuscation
methods [5, 8, 35].
Protections. We only consider tractable path-
oriented protections and select both a new SVP
scheme (For) and an existing non-SVP scheme
(Split), inserted in a robust-by-design way. We vary
the number of forking points per path (parameter k).
We also consider standard protections: Virtualiza-
tion (up to 3 levels), arithmetic encoding and flatten-
ing [46]. Previous work [5] has shown that nested
virtualization is the sole standard protection useful
against DSE. Our results confirm that, so we report
only results about virtualization (other results partly
in Appendix).
8.2 Datasets
We select small and medium programs for experiments
as they represent the worst case for program protec-
tion. If path-oriented protections can slow down DSE
analysis substantially on smaller programs, then those
protections can only give better results for larger pro-
grams.
Dataset #1. This synthetic dataset from Banescu et
al 3 [5] offers a valuable diversity of functions and has
already been used to assess resilience against DSE. It
has 48 C programs (between 11 and 24 lines of code)
including control-flow statements, integer arithmetic
and system calls to printf . We exclude 2 programs be-
cause reaching full coverage took considerably longer
than for the other 46 programs and blurred the overall
results. Also, some programs have only a 1-byte input
space, making them too easy to brute force (Goal 2).
We turn them into equivalent 8-byte input programs
with same number of paths – additional input are not
used by the program, but latter protections will rely
on them. The maximum time to obtain full coverage
on the 46 programs with KLEE is 33s, mean time is
2.34s (Appendix B).
3https://github.com/tum-i22/obfuscation-benchmarks
Dataset #2. The second dataset comprises 7 larger
realistic programs, representative of real-life protec-
tion scenarios: 4 hash functions (City, Fast, Spooky,
md5), 2 cryptographic encoding functions (AES, DES)
and a snippet from the GRUB bootloader. Unob-
fuscated programs have between 101 and 934 LOCs:
KLEE needs at most 33.31s to explore all paths, mean
time is 8s (Appendix B).
8.3 Impact on Dynamic Symbolic Ex-
ecution
Protocol. To assess the impact of protections against
DSE, we consider the induced slowdown (time) of
symbolic execution on an obfuscated program w.r.t.
its original version. Fore more readable results, we
only report whether DSE achieves its goal or times
out.
For Path Exploration (Goal 1), we use programs
from Datasets #1 and #2, add the protections and
launch KLEE untils it reports full coverage or times
out – 3h for Dataset #1, or a 5,400× average slow-
down, 24h for Dataset #2, or a 10,000x average slow-
down.
For Secret finding (Goal 2), we modify the pro-
grams from both datasets into “secret finding” ori-
ented code (e.g.,win / lose) and set up KLEE to stop
execution as soon as the secret is found. We take
the whole Dataset #2, but restrict Dataset #1 to
the 15 programs with 16-byte input space. We set
smaller timeouts (1h for Dataset #1, 3h and 8h for
Dataset #2) as the time to find the secret with KLEE
on the original programs is substantially lower (0.3s
average).
Table 3: Impact of obfuscations on DSE
Transformation
Dataset #1 Dataset #2
(#TO/#Samples)
Goal 1
3h TO
Goal 2
1h TO
Goal 1
24h TO
Goal 2
3h TO
Goal 2
8h TO
Virt 0/46 0/15 0/7 0/7 0/7
Virt ×2 1/46 0/15 0/7 0/7 0/7
Virt ×3 5/46 2/15 1/7 0/7 0/7
SPLIT (k = 10) 1/46 0/15 0/7 0/7 0/7
SPLIT (k = 13) 4/46 0/15 1/7 1/7 0/7
SPLIT (k = 17) 18/46 2/15 3/7 2/7 1/7
FOR (k = 1) 2/46 0/15 0/7 0/7 0/7
FOR (k = 3) 30/46 8/15 3/7 2/7 1/7
FOR (k = 5) 46/46 15/15 7/7 7/7 7/7
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Results & Observations. Table 3 shows the num-
ber of timeouts during symbolic execution for each
obfuscation and goal. For example, KLEE is always
able to cover all paths on Dataset #1 against simple
Virtualization (0/46 TO) – the protection is useless
here, while it fails on ≈ 40% of the programs with
Split (k = 17), and never succeeds with For (k = 5).
As expected, higher levels of protections (more vir-
tualization layers or more forking points) result in
better protection. Yet, results of Sec. 8.4 will show
that while increasing forking points is cheap, increas-
ing levels of virtualization is quickly prohibitive.
Virtualization is rather weak for both goals – only 3
levels of virtualization manage some protection. For
performs very well for both goals: with k = 3 and
Dataset #1, For induces a timeout for more than
half the programs for both goals, which is significantly
better than Virt×3. With k = 5, all programs time-
out. In between, Split is efficient for Goal 1 (even
though it requires much higher k than For) but not
for Goal 2 – see for example Dataset #1 and k = 17:
39% timeouts (18/46) for Goal 1, only 13% (2/15) for
Goal 2.
Other (unreported) results. All standard protec-
tions from Tigress we used turns out to be ineffec-
tive against DSE – for example Flattening and En-
codeArithmetic on Dataset#1 slows path exploration
by a maximum factor of 10, which is far from critical.
Search heuristics obviously do not make any difference
in the case of Path Exploration (Goal 1). Still, DFS
tends to perform slightly better than BFS and NURS
against Split in the case of Secret Finding (Goal 2).
No other difference is visible. Experiments with two
binary-level DSE engines supported by different SMT
solvers (Binsec [24] with Boolector [13], and Tri-
ton [36] with Z3 [25]) are in line with those reported
here. Actually, as expected, both engines perform
worse than KLEE. Part of these results can be found
in Appendix.
Conclusion. As already stated in the literature,
standard protections such as nested virtualization
are mostly inefficient against DSE attacks. Path-
oriented protections are shown here to offer a stronger
protection. Yet, care must be taken. Non-SVP path
protections such as Split do improve over nested
virtualization (Split with k = 13 is roughly equivalent
to Virt ×3, with k = 17 it is clearly superior), but
they provide only a weak-to-mild protection in the
cases of Secret Finding (Goal 2) or large time outs.
On the other hand, SVP protections (represented here
by For) are able to discard all DSE attacks on our
benchmarks for both Path Exploration and Secret
Finding with only k = 5, demonstrating a protection
power against DSE far above those of standard and
non-SVP path protections.
To conclude, path-oriented protections are indeed
a tool of choice against DSE attacks (RQ1), much
stronger than standard ones (RQ4). In addition, SVP
allows to predict the strength difference of these pro-
tections (RQ4), against Coverage or Secret Finding.
8.4 Impact on Runtime Performance
Protocol. We evaluate the cost of path-oriented
protections by measuring the runtime overhead (RO)
and the (binary-level) code size increase (CI) of an
obfuscated program w.r.t. its original version. We
consider also two variants of For– its recursive encod-
ing REC (Sec. 7.1) and the more robust P2 encoding
(Sec. 8.5), as well as the untractable word-level For
scheme (Sec. 5), coined WORD.
Table 4: Impact of obfuscations on runtime perfor-
mance
Transformation
Dataset #1 Dataset #2
RO CI RO CI
Virt ×1.5 ×1.5 ×1.7 ×1.4
Virt ×2 ×15 ×2.5 ×5.1 ×2.1
Virt ×3 ×1.6 ·103 ×4 ×362 ×3.0
SPLIT (k = 10) ×1.2 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0
SPLIT (k = 13) ×1.2 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0
SPLIT (k = 50) ×1.5 ×1.5 ×1.1 ×1.0
FOR (k = 1) ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0
FOR (k = 3) ×1.1 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0
FOR (k = 5) ×1.3 ×1.0 ×1.1 ×1.0
FOR (k = 50) ×1.5 ×1.5 ×1.2 ×1.1
FOR (k = 5) P2 ×1.3 ×1.0 ×1.1 ×1.0
FOR (k = 5) REC ×3.0 ×1.0 ×2.7 ×1.0
FOR (k = 1) WORD ×2.6 ·103 ×1.0 ×2.1 ·103 ×1.0
Results & Observations. Results are shown in
Table 4 as average values over all programs in the
datasets. As expected, nested virtualization intro-
duces a significant and prohibitive runtime overhead
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(three layers: ×1.6 · 103 for Dataset #1 and ×362
for Dataset #2), and each new layer comes at a high
price (from 1 to 2: between ×3 and ×10; from 2 to 3:
between ×70 and ×100). Moreover, the code size is
also increased, but in a more manageable way (still, at
least ×3 for three layers). On the other hand, Split
and For introduce only very low runtime overhead
(at most ×1.3 on Dataset #1 and ×1.1 on Dataset
#2), and no noticeable code size increase is reported
even for k = 50. Regarding variants of For, P2 does
not show any overhead w.r.t. For, while the recursive
encoding REC comes at a higher price. Finally, as
predicted by our framework, WORD is intractable.
Conclusion. As expected, tractable path-oriented
protections indeed yield only a very slight overhead,
both in terms of time or code size (RQ2), and improv-
ing the level of protection (k) is rather cheap, while
nested virtualization comes at a high price (RQ4).
Coupled with results of Sec. 8.3, it turns out that
path-oriented protections offer a much better anti-
DSE protection than nested virtualization at a run-
time cost several orders of magnitude lower. Also, the
code size increase due to path-oriented protections
seems compatible with strict memory requirements
(e.g., embedded systems) where it is not the case for
nested virtualization.
Table 5: Robustness of path-oriented protections
Tool
Robust ?
P1 P2 P3
(basic)
(obfuscated)
(weak)
GCC -Ofast X X ×
clang -Ofast × X ×
Frama-C Slice X X ×
Frama-C Taint X X X
Triton (taint) X X X
KLEE X X X
X: no protection simplified ×: ≥ 1 protection
simplified
8.5 Robustness to taint and slice at-
tacks
Protocol. We consider the heavily optimized com-
pilers Clang & GCC (many simplifications including
slicing), the industrial-strength Frama-C static code
analyzer (both its Taint and Slice plugins together
with precise interprocedural range analysis) as well
as Triton (which features tainting) and KLEE. We
take 6 programs from dataset #1 (with 16-byte input
space) and all programs from dataset #2. We use the
For scheme (k=3) weaved into the code following our
robust-by-design method (Sec. 6.2). Actually we con-
sider 3 variants of the scheme: P1, P2 and P3. P1 is
the simple version of For presented in Fig. 8, P2 is a
mildly obfuscated version (adds a if statement always
evaluating to true in the loop – opaque predicate)
and P3 relies on fake inputs (a dangerous construc-
tion discussed in Sec. 7.3). A protection will be said
to be simplified when the number of explored paths
for full coverage is much lower than expected (DSE
tools), no protection code is marked by the analysis
tool (Frama-C) or running KLEE on the produced
code does not show any difference (compilers).
Results & Observations. Results in Table 5 con-
firm our expectations. No analyzer but clang is able
to simplify our robust-by-design protections (P1 and
P2), whereas the weaker P3 is broken by slicing (GCC,
clang, Frama-C) but not by tainting – exactly as
pointed out in Sec. 7.3. Interestingly, clang -Ofast sim-
plifies scheme P1, not due to slicing (this is resistant
by design), but thanks to some loop simplification
more akin to a pattern attack, relying on finding an
affine relation between variables and loop counters.
The slightly obfuscated version P2 is immune to this
particular attack.
Conclusion. It turns out that our robust-by-design
method indeed works as expected against taint and
slice (RQ3). Yet, care must be taken to avoid pattern-
like simplifications. Note that in a real scenario, the
attacker must work on binary code, making static
analysis much more complicated. Also, virtualization,
unpacking or self-modification can be used in addi-
tion to path-oriented protections to completely hinder
static analysis.
14
9 Application: hardened
benchmark
We propose a set of benchmarks containing 4 pro-
grams from Banescu’s dataset and our 6 real-world
programs (GRUB excluded) from Sec. 8.2 in order to
help advance the state of the art of symbolic deobfus-
cation. Each program comes with two setups, Path
Exploration and Secret Finding, obfuscated with both
a path-oriented protection (For k=5, taint- and slice-
resistant) and a virtualization layer against human
and static attacks4. Table 6 shows the performance
of KLEE, Triton and Binsec (Secret Finding, 24h
timeout). Unprotected and virtualized codes are eas-
ily solved, but hardened versions remain unsolved
within the timeout, for every tool.
Table 6: Results on 10 hardened examples (secret
finding)
Unprotected Virt ×1 Hardened – For (k=5)
(TO = 10 sec) (TO = 5 min) (TO = 24h)
KLEE 10/10 10/10 0/10 X
Binsec 10/10 10/10 0/10 X
Triton 10/10 10/10 0/10 X
10 Discussion
10.1 On the methodology
We discuss biases our experimental evaluation could
suffer from.
Metrics. We add overhead metrics (runtime, code
size) to the commonly used “DSE slowdown” measure
[5, 35], giving a better account of the pros and cons
of obfuscation methods.
Obfuscation techniques & tools. We consider
the strongest standard obfuscation methods known
against DSE, as identified in previous systematic stud-
ies [5, 35]. We restrict ourselves to their implementa-
tion in Tigress, a widely respected and freely available
obfuscation tool considered state-of-the-art – studies
including Tigress along packers and protected mal-
ware [8, 49] do not report serious deficiencies about
4Sources available at https://bit.ly/2GNxNv9
its protections. Anyway, the evaluation of the path-
oriented protections is independent of Tigress.
DSE engines. We use 3 symbolic execution engines
(mostly KLEE, also Binsec and Triton) working on
different program representations (C source, binary),
with very similar final results. Moreover, KLEE is a
highly respected tool, implementing advanced path
pruning methods (path merging) and solving strate-
gies. It also benefits from code-level optimizations
of Clang as it operates on LLVM bitcode. Previous
work [5] considers KLEE as the worst-case attackers,
in front of Triton [36] and angr [41].
Benchmarks. Our benchmarks include Banescu et
al.’s synthetic benchmarks [5], enriched by 7 larger
real-life programs consisting essentially of hash func-
tions (a typical software asset one has to protect) [35].
We also work both on source and binary code to add
another level of variability. As already said, the con-
sidered programs are rather small, on purpose, to
embody the defender worst case. Note that this case
still represents real life situations, e.g., protecting
small critical assets from targeted DSE attacks.
10.2 Generality of path-oriented pro-
tections
Path-oriented protections should be effective on a
larger class of attacks besides DSE – actually, all ma-
jor semantic program analysis techniques. Indeed, all
path-unrolling methods will suffer from path explo-
sion, including Bounded model checking [10], back-
ward bounded DSE [8] and abstract interpretation
with aggressive trace partitioning [31]. Model check-
ing based on counter-example guided refinement [29]
will suffer both from path explosion and Single Value
Path protections – yielding ineffective refinements in
the vein of [14]. Finally, standard abstract interpre-
tation [4] will suffer from significant precision loss
due to the many introduced merge points – anyway
purely static techniques cannot currently cope with
self-modification or packing.
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10.3 Countermeasures and mitiga-
tions
We can think of three possible mitigations a DSE
attacker could use against our new defenses: 1. remove
the protection through tainting and slicing; 2. detect
our defenses via pattern attacks and 3. directly handle
the protection through advanced semantic techniques
for loops. Slicing, tainting and pattern attacks, are
thoroughly discussed in Sec. 6.2 and 7.
Advanced program analysis techniques for loops is a
very hot research topic, still largely open in the case
of under-approximation methods such as DSE. The
best methods for DSE are based on path merging [3],
but they lack a generalization step allowing to com-
pletely capture loop semantics. Even though KLEE
implements such path merging, it still fails against our
protections. Widening in abstract interpretation [4]
over-approximates loop semantics, but the result is
often very crude: using such over-approximations in-
side DSE is still an open question. Anti-implicit flow
techniques [32, 33] may identify dataflow hidden as
control-flow (it identified for instance a For fork-
ing point), yet they do not recover any precise loop
semantics and thus cannot reduce path explosion.
Finally, note that: 1. obfuscation schemes can easily
be scattered along several functions (see alternative
For encodings in Sec. 7.1) to bar expensive but tar-
geted intra-procedural attacks – attackers will need
(costly) precise inter-procedural methods, 2. real-life
attacks are performed on binary code – binary-level
static analysis is known to be extremely hard to get
precise; and 3. static analysis is completely broken by
packing or self-modification.
11 Related Work
We have already discsussed obfuscation, symbolic exe-
cution and symbolic deobfuscation at length through-
out the paper, including successful applications of
DSE-related techniques to deobfuscation [8,22,35,49].
In addition, Schrittwieser et al. [37] give an exhaustive
survey about program analysis-based deobfuscation,
while Schwartz et al. [38] review DSE, tainting and
their applications in security.
Limits of symbolic execution. Anand et al. [2]
describe, in the setting of automatic testing, the three
major weaknesses of DSE: Path explosion, Path diver-
gence and Complex constraints. Cadar [15] shows that
compiler optimizations can sensibly alter the perfor-
mance of a symbolic analyzer like KLEE, confirming
the folklore knowledge that strong enough compiler
optimizations resemble code obfuscations. That said,
the performance penalty is far from offering a strong
defense against symbolic deobfuscation.
Constraint-based anti-DSE protections. Most
anti-DSE techniques target the constraint solving en-
gine through hard-to-solve predicates. The impact
on symbolic deobfuscation through the complexifi-
cation of constraints has been studied by Banescu
et al. [6]. Biondi et al. [11] propose an obfuscation
based on Mixed Boolean-Arithmetic expressions [50]
to complexify points-to functions, making it harder
for solvers to determine the trigger. Eyrolles et al. [27]
present a similar obfuscation together with a MBA
expression simplifier based on pattern matching and
arithmetic simplifications. Cryptographic hash func-
tions hinder current solvers and can replace MBA [40].
In general, formula hardness is difficult to predict,
and solving such formulas is a hot research topic.
Though cryptographic functions resist solvers up to
now, promising attempts [34] exist. More importantly,
private keys must also be protected against symbolic
attacks, yielding a potentially easier deobfuscation
subgoal – a standard whitebox cryptography issue.
Other anti-DSE protections. Yadegari and De-
bray [48] describe obfuscations thwarting standard
byte-level taint analysis, possibly resulting in missing
legitimate paths for DSE engines using taint analysis
(Triton does, KLEE and Binsec do not). It can be
circumvented in the case of taint-based DSE by bit-
level tainting [48]. Symbolic Code combines this idea
with input-dependent trigger-based self modifications.
Here, the dynamic analysis part of DSE must be able
to detect these input-dependent self-modifications. So-
lutions exist but must be carefully integrated [8,12].
Wang et al. [47] propose an obfuscation based on
mathematical conjectures in the vein of the Collatz
conjecture. This transformation increases the number
of (symbolic) paths through an input-dependent loop,
16
while the conjecture (should) ensure that the loop al-
ways converges to the same result. Banescu et al. [5]
propose an anti-DSE technique based on encryption
and proved to be highly effective, but it requires some
form of secret sharing (the key) and thus falls outside
the strict scope of MATE attacks that we consider
here. Stephens et al. [43] recently proposed an obfus-
cation based on covert channels (timing, etc.) to hide
data flow within invisible states. Current tools do not
handle correctly this kind of protections. However,
the method ensures only probabilistic correctness and
thus cannot be applied in every context.
Systematic evaluation of anti-DSE techniques.
Banescu et al. [5] set the ground for the experimental
evaluation of symbolic deobfuscation techniques. Our
own experimental evaluation extends and refines their
method in several ways: new metrics, different DSE
settings, larger examples. Bruni et al. [14] propose a
mathematically proven obfuscation against Abstract
Model Checking attacks.
12 Conclusion
Code obfuscation intends to protect proprietary soft-
ware assets against attacks such as reverse engineering
or code tampering. Yet, recently proposed (auto-
mated) attacks based on symbolic execution (DSE)
and semantic reasoning have shown a great poten-
tial against traditional obfuscation methods. We ex-
plore a new class of anti-DSE techniques targeting
the very weak spot of these approaches, namely path
exploration. We propose a predictive framework for
understanding such path-oriented protections, and
we propose new lightweight, efficient and resistant
obfuscations. Experimental evaluation indicates that
our method critically damages symbolic deobfuscation
while yielding only a very small overhead.
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A Additional information on
patterns
Write. In this section we give more details about the
Write obfuscation. As previously stated in Sec. 5 this
transformation involves self-modification: the code
directly modify the executed instructions at runtime.
A step by step exemple of Write is presented in
Fig. 9.
Figure 9: Step by Step execution of Write with the
runtime value of input being 100
1 L : mov [ a ] , [ input ] → L1 : mov L2+o f f , [ input ]
L2 : mov [ a ] , 0
2 L : mov [ a ] , [ input ] L1 : mov L2+o f f , [ input ]→ L2 : mov [ a ] , runtime val
3 L : mov [ a ] , [ input ] L1 : mov L2+o f f , [ input ]→ L2 : mov [ a ] , 100
The original code (a simple mov) is replaced by a
two-line self-modification. The instruction at address
L1 replaces the value “0” in line L2 by the runtime
value of input (step1). Then, when the program
executes the instruction at L2 (step 2) the value given
to a is actually the value of input, which is 100 in this
exemple.
This transformation does not change the semantics
of the program as both code give input’s value to a.
However, where the original code has one path and
one code version the modified program has one path
and one code version for each value of input.
For. Here, we further explain how the For pattern is
made tractable in time. As we already stated, using an
int variable (or bigger) variable substantially increase
the size of execution traces. To mitigate this side
effect we have to apply the For protection only to
byte variables. This problem is showned in Fig. 10.
This trick allows For to offer the same symbolic
slowdown at almost no cost — none in practice for a
real-world program.
B Statistics on datasets
We present additional statistics on Dataset #1 (Ap-
pendix Table 7) and Dataset #2 (Appendix Table 8).
For Dataset #1, recall that 1-byte input programs
Figure 10: Impact of variable size to For strength
and cost
Pattern Paths
Loop
iterations
int func (int x) {
int var = 0 ;
for ( int i =0; i<x ; i++) {
var++;
}
return var ;
}
232 ≤ 232
int func ( int x ) {
char tmp[4] = x;
char var [ 4 ] = {0} ;
for ( int i =0; i<tmp[0] ; i++){
var [0]++;
}
for ( int i =0; i<tmp[1] ; i++){
var [1]++;
}
// same fo r tmp [ 2 : 3 ]
return var ;
}
232 ≤ 4× 28
from the original dataset from Banescu et al. [5] are
automatically turned into equivalent 8-byte input pro-
grams with same number of paths: additional input
are not used by the program, but latter protections
will rely on them. We must do so as they are otherwise
too easy to enumerate.
Table 7: Statistics on Dataset #1 (46 programs)
‘
Entry size
#LOC KLEE exec. (s)
aver-
age
Std-
Dev.
aver-
age
Std-
Dev.
16 bytes 21 1.9 2.6s 6.2
1 byte (*) 17 2.2 1.8s 6.2
loc: line of code
(*) 1-byte input programs are automatically turned
into equivalent 8-byte input programs with same num-
ber of paths. We report KLEE execution time on the
modified versions.
C Additional experiments
Search heuristics. Results in Appendix Table 9
shows that DSE search heuristics does not impact
that much overall results (cf. Table 3). Depth-first
search appears to be slightly better than the two
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Table 8: Statistics on Dataset #2 (7 programs)
Program locs KLEE exec. (s)
City hash 547 7.41
Fast hash 934 7.74
Spooky hash 625 7.12
MD5 hash 157 33.31
AES 571 1.42
DES 424 0.15
GRUB 101 0.06
other ones for Split, and non-uniform random search
appears to be slightly worse than the two other ones
for For. Nothing dramatic yet.
Table 9: Impact of search heuristics – Dataset #1 –
secret finding – 1h TO
Timeouts
NURS BFS DFS allpath
Virt 0/15 0/15 0/15 0/15
Virt ×2 0/15 0/15 0/15 0/15
Virt ×3 1/15 1/15 1/15 2/15
Flat-Virt 0/15 0/15 0/15 0/15
Flat-MBA 0/15 0/15 0/15 0/15
Split (×10) 0/15 0/15 0/15 0/15
Split (×13) 1/15 1/15 0/15 1/15
For (k = 1) 0/15 0/15 0/15 0/15
For (k = 2) 1/15 1/15 1/15 4/15
For (k = 3) 10/15 8/15 8/15 13/15
For (k = 4) 15/15 15/15 15/15 15/15
Runtime overhead. We evaluate how the perfor-
mance penalty evolved for protection For on very
high values of k. We take the 15 examples of Dataset
#1 with large input space, and we vary the size of
the input string from 3 to 100000, increasing the num-
ber of forking points accordingly (k between 3 and
100000), one forking point (loop) per byte of the in-
put string. We run 15 random inputs 15 times for
each size and measure the average runtime overhead.
Fig. 11 shows the evolution of runtime overhead w.r.t.
the number of For loops.
The runtime overhead stays below 5% (×1.05) for
fewer than k = 250. This means in particular that one
can significantly boost For-based protections without
incurring big runtime penalties.
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Figure 11: Runtime overhead w.r.t. to the number of
For obfuscation loops
D More details on experiments
We give here more detailed results on:
• the motivating example (Appendix Table 10),
• Path Exploration Dataset #1 (Appendix Ta-
ble 11),
• Secret Finding DataSet #1 (Appendix Table 12).
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Table 10: Benchmarking obfuscations on the crackme example – tool KLEE– 1h30 timeout.
Obfuscation type
Slowdown
Symbolic Execution
Overhead
Runtime
Overhead
Code Size
Coverage Secret
Tigress
Virt ×2 ×5.4 · 103 ×11 ×1.3 ×1.2
Virt ×3 TO ×1.1 · 103 ×41 ×3.0
Virt ×4 TO ×96 · 103 ×4.5 · 103 ×4.0
Virt ×5 TO TO ×449 · 103 ×5.2
Virt-Flat ×1.0 ×1.8 ×1.1 ×1.5
Flat ×2 ×276 ×1.8 ×1.1 ×1.3
Flat-EncA ×83 ×1.2 ×1.0 ×1.0
Our approach
k = 1 TO ×3.3 · 103 ×1.0 ×1.0
For k = 2 TO TO ×1.0 ×1.0
k = 3 TO TO ×1.0 ×1.0
k = 11 ×3.4 · 103 ×2.8 ×1.0 ×1.0
Split k = 15 TO ×3.9 ×1.0 ×1.0
k = 19 TO ×5.1 ×1.0 ×1.0
Table 11: Obfuscations on Dataset #1 — allpath coverage — 3h timeout
DSE Slowdown Runtime overhead Code Size increase
#TO
Transformation min max avg min max avg min max avg
Virt ×1.0 ×17 ×2.8 ×1.2 ×5.6 ×1.5 ×1.5 ×1.5 ×1.5 0/46
Virt ×2 ×1.0 ×402 ×47 ×1.3 ×432 ×15 ×2.3 ×2.8 ×2.5 1/46
Virt ×3 ×10 ×35 · 103 ×3.0 · 103 ×3.2 ×52 · 103 ×1.6 · 103 ×3.5 ×4.6 ×4 5/46
Flattening ×1.0 ×1.3 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×2.0 ×1.8 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 0/46
EncodeArithmetic ×1.0 ×10 ×3.9 ×1.0 ×2.0 ×1.8 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 0/46
Split (k = 10) ×10 ×1.2 · 103 ×107 ×1.0 ×1.3 ×1.2 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 1/46
Split (k = 13) ×10 ×15 · 103 ×862 ×1.0 ×1.3 ×1.2 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 4/46
For (k = 1) ×10 ×476 ×209 ×1.0 ×1.4 ×1.2 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 2/46
For (k = 2) ×10 ×33 · 103 ×3.7 · 103 ×1.0 ×1.4 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 10/46
For (k = 3) ×10 ×1.1 · 106 ×2.2 · 105 ×1.0 ×1.4 ×1.3 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 30/46
For (k = 4) ×10 ×2.2 · 106 ×5.1 · 105 ×1.0 ×1.4 ×1.3 ×1.0 ×1.0 ×1.0 46/46
Virt + For (k = 2) ×10 ×5.4 · 105 ×33 · 103 ×1.0 ×3.8 ×1.2 ×1.5 ×1.6 ×1.6 23/46
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Table 12: Obfuscations on Dataset #1 — — Secret Finding — DFS heuristics, 1h timeout
DSE slowdown Runtime overhead
#TO
Transformation min max avg min max avg
Virt ×1.0 ×4.0 ×1.6 ×1.2 ×1.4 ×1.3 0/15
Virt ×2 ×6 ×268 ×33 ×1.3 ×6.3 ×2.5 0/15
Virt ×3 ×557 ×4.7 · 103 ×1.7 · 103 ×5.5 ×513 ×126 2/15
Flat-Virt ×1.0 ×8.3 ×2.3 ×1.2 ×1.5 ×1.3 0/15
Flat-MBA ×2.0 ×878 ×59 ×1.2 ×1.3 ×1.3 0/15
Split (k = 10) ×1.1 ×9 ×6 ×1.0 ×1.3 ×1.2 0/15
Split (k = 13) ×1.1 ×12 ×8 ×1.3 ×1.8 ×1.6 0/15
For (k = 1) ×7 ×1.1 · 103 ×169 ×1.0 ×1.1 ×1.0 0/15
For (k = 2) ×841 ×1.7 · 105 ×17 · 103 ×1.0 ×1.1 ×1.0 1/15
For (k = 3) ×2.3 · 103 ×3.6 · 105 ×1.6 · 105 ×1.0 ×1.1 ×1.0 8/15
For (k = 4) ×2.1 · 105 ×4.2 · 105 ×3.2 · 105 ×1.0 ×1.1 ×1.0 15/15
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